

MAYOR OF LONDON

SHARED

ENDEAVOUR

FUND

Theory of Change

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1. OVERVIEW

The Shared Endeavour Fund is a prevention funding scheme run by the [Counter Terrorism and Counter Extremism \(CT&CE\) Hub](#) at the [Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime \(MOPAC\)](#) on behalf of the Mayor of London Sadiq Khan. First launched in 2020, the Shared Endeavour Fund has delivered multiple rounds of grants for initiatives designed to build Londoners' resilience to radicalisation and extremist recruitment, and challenge intolerance, hate, extremism and terrorism in the capital. The Fund is currently administered by [Groundwork London](#) and evaluated by [The Science of P/CVE](#).

The Shared Endeavour Fund offers grants to civil society organisations (CSOs) for seven-month prevention projects delivered in London. Organisations may apply for grants from one of three funding tiers ranging from £10,000 to £100,000 and differentiated by the amount of money available and the geographic scope of prospective project activities. Project applications are required to contribute to one or more of the following priority themes:



Raise awareness

Help Londoners recognise and critically assess intolerant, hateful and extremist messages, empowering them to reject harmful ideologies.



Build resilience

Support at-risk individuals in strengthening their psychosocial resilience against radicalisation.



Promote positive action

Equip Londoners with the confidence and skills to safely challenge intolerance, hate and extremism.



Enhance prevention efforts

Provide training and support for educators, social workers and other frontline practitioners to prevent intolerance, hate and extremism.

This document outlines the Theory of Change for the Shared Endeavour Fund and illustrates how supported projects are expected to stimulate short-, medium- and long-term changes in the knowledge, attitudes and behaviours of beneficiaries. Theory of Change is a planning approach for understanding how and why a project or programme is expected to produce desired results in a particular context. It provides a comprehensive description and illustration of the pathways of change that link programmatic inputs through to eventual societal impacts. The purpose of this Theory of Change is to support the design, delivery and evaluation of the Shared Endeavour Fund by unpacking the causal processes, assumptions and evidence base that underpin its implementation and results.

2. CONTEXT

2.1 Terrorism, Hate and Extremism

Since the launch of the Shared Endeavour Fund, terrorism, hate and extremism have remained significant threats to London and the UK. The country has experienced 15 domestic terror attacks since 2017, with a further 43 late-stage plots disrupted during this period.¹ In 2024, Counter Terrorism Policing (CTP) and MI5 made 248 arrests for terrorism-related offences, the highest number in a single year since 2019, 16% of which were for young people aged 17 and under.² Police and security services are also currently engaged in more than 800 investigations across the country, a significant proportion in London.³ In light of these risks, the government has maintained the national terrorism threat level at ‘substantial’ since 2022, meaning that an attack is likely. The government’s [CONTEST](#) strategy summarised the current risk facing the UK as ‘enduring and evolving’, with a domestic threat that ‘is less predictable and harder to detect and investigate’.⁴

The landscape of on- and offline extremism has also evolved since Call One, with the period from 2017 to 2026 marked by persistent threats and new challenges. The COVID-19 pandemic and associated restrictions in 2020 and 2021 provided fertile ground for extremist movements to proliferate, fostering anti-minority hatred while mobilising the public against government countermeasures. The crisis helped catalyse an increasingly complex online extremist ecosystem in which the ‘boundaries between disinformation, hate speech, harassment, conspiracy theories and extremist mobilisation became ever more blurred.’⁵ Even after the pandemic, this hybridised threat environment has endured. Transnational extremist communities in Europe and North America continue to use social media platforms to inflame and exploit local grievances in order to undermine democratic processes and incite violence and hate against minority communities.⁶ This was most evident in the disorder following the 2024 Southport attack, which sparked a wave of far-right, anti-immigrant violence fuelled in large part by misinformation around the identity of the perpetrator.⁷

In terms of the ideologies motivating terrorism, the government still considers Islamist extremism to be the dominant threat to the UK, accounting for 67% of attacks since 2017, about three quarters of MI5’s caseload and 63% of those in custody for terrorism-related offences.⁸ However, in recent years, threats have increased from far-right actors due in large part to the strength of their online international networks and the mainstreaming of radical right-wing parties and politicians in Europe and America.⁹ Far-right terrorism has accounted for 22% of attacks since 2017, about a quarter of MI5’s caseload and 29% of those in custody for terrorism-related offences.¹⁰ Moreover, for the fourth year running, individuals reported due to far-right concerns represented the largest proportion of Prevent referrals for a single ideology (1,314 individuals; 19%) and by far the most likely referrals to be adopted as Channel cases (230; 45%).¹¹ Historically, this trend has proven particularly acute among young people; 95% of under 18s arrested in 2021 for counter-terrorism offences showed far-right sympathies.¹²

Beyond these traditional extremist ideologies, the period since 2019 has also seen a marked rise in forms of radicalisation that fall outside conventional ideological classifications. These include cases categorised by Prevent as mixed, unstable and unclear, as well as those linked

to violence fixation, nihilistic extremism and extreme misogyny. Together, these accounted for almost a quarter of referrals in 2023/2024 (1,495 individuals; 22%).¹³ Individuals affected by these forms of extremism often display shifting, incoherent belief systems that draw from multiple ideologies, or they exhibit a fascination with mass-casualty violence with no clear ideological underpinnings, but which nonetheless presents a credible terrorism risk. These individuals are typically embedded in online ecosystems and communities where users move fluidly between far-right, manosphere, conspiratorial and violence-glorifying content, all driven by algorithms that escalate engagement with increasingly radical material.¹⁴ In this context, radicalisation pathways are rarely linear, leading to a hybridised, decentralised threat that is significantly more difficult for police and practitioners to identify and disrupt through traditional counter-extremism approaches.¹⁵

In this environment, minority communities continue to bear the brunt of on- and offline hate. The number of hate crimes recorded by the police has steadily risen over the last decade, predominantly targeting ethnic and religious minorities, migrants and the LGBTQ+ community.¹⁶ This increase is partly due to improved identification of hate crimes since 2014, which complicates efforts to use police figures to track long-term trends. Nevertheless, fluctuations in the monthly rate of hate incidents are informative and are usually tied to real world events such as the 2016 EU referendum, 2017 terror attacks, 2020 racial justice protests and more recently, the Israel–Palestine Conflict. Since the 7 October 2023 attack, there has been a significant rise in the rates of on- and offline antisemitic and anti-Muslim hate, accompanied by surges in extremist mobilisation across the ideological spectrum.¹⁷ The Community Security Trust recorded 4,296 antisemitic hate incidents in 2023 (an almost 260% increase on the previous year) and 3,528 in 2024. Despite this decline, 2024 is still the second highest year on record.¹⁸ This is equally mirrored by Tell MAMA’s tracking of anti-Muslim hate; the organisation recorded 4,406 incidents in 2023 and a further 6,313 in 2024, with no signs of this trend abating in 2026.¹⁹ These incidents have added to a climate of fear and polarisation, which will likely have long-term reverberations within and between communities.

2.2 Civil Society Funding

Civil society actors have increasingly been recognised as crucial partners in government efforts to address intolerance, hate and extremism because of their unique access to, knowledge of and credibility within local communities.²⁰ The parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee inquiry into the 2017 terror attacks repeatedly underscored the need to provide resources for local efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism. Its report recommended that the UK government commit to ‘build[ing] stronger partnerships with communities, civil society groups, public sector institutions and industry.’²¹ In 2024, Home Secretary Yvette Cooper further reinforced this sentiment, stating that the government would pursue a new strategic approach to counter-extremism based on close cooperation with communities.²² These statements reflect global developments in the field of P/CVE, which has increasingly promoted whole-of-society approaches that harness the benefits of CSOs as prevention best practice.²³


However, while CSOs may bring many advantages to addressing intolerance, hate and extremism, they often suffer from a lack of funding and support. This situation has been compounded in recent years by the UK cost-of-living crisis, which has forced CSOs to contend

with increasing demand for their services, reduced funding and rising costs.²⁴ High inflation and economic uncertainty have strained the sector's ability to deliver outcomes, even where grants remain nominally available. CSOs report rising venue, staffing and operational costs, while the value of public and charitable grants has declined in real terms.²⁵

The Government offers limited funding to CSOs for addressing intolerance, hate and extremism. The grant-funding strand of the Home Offices' Building a Stronger Britain Together (BSBT) programme, which supported over 250 projects from 2016, has been closed since 2020, with no replacement of equivalent scale.²⁶ Other national funding schemes in this space have tended to be short-term and limited in scope. For example, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) ran a one-off Faith, Race and Hate Crime Grant Scheme in 2020–21, supporting just nine projects nationally, and the Welsh Government launched a Hate Crime Minority Communities Grant programme in 2019–2021 funding just eight.²⁷ Meanwhile, local authorities also possess few resources to devote towards CSO-led prevention activities. Many have faced deep budget cuts, forcing the withdrawal of support for non-statutory areas like cohesion, youth engagement and community safety. Local authorities have also seen much of their counter-extremism funding reduced, with Prevent funding for London cut by two-thirds as of April 2025.²⁸

As for philanthropic support, this can often be sparse and hard to access due to the sensitive and, in some quarters, controversial nature of the subject matter. Notable exceptions include Google.org's Innovation Fund to Counter Hate and Extremism (2017–2018) and more recently the Youth Endowment Fund, which supports long-term violence reduction initiatives and has some overlap with efforts to address intolerance, hate and extremism. However, such examples remain rare. Where philanthropic funding does exist, it is often fragmented, short-term and insufficient to meet the scale of the need. As a result, the capacity of CSOs to serve as effective prevention partners for government has been significantly constrained by their inability to access stable funding.

3. SHARED ENDEAVOUR FUND LOGIC MODEL



ASSUMPTIONS What conditions, factors or risks may affect Fund results?

<p>CAUSAL LINK ASSUMPTIONS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capable grantees apply for and are awarded Shared Endeavour Fund grants. • Targeted beneficiaries are relevant to the priorities of the Shared Endeavour Fund and are sufficiently incentivised and able to participate in project activities. • The scale and duration of supported projects is sufficient for them to achieve a measurable contribution to the priority themes of the Shared Endeavour Fund. • CSOs have unique access to, knowledge of and credibility among local communities, making them effective prevention partners for government. 	<p>EXTERNAL FACTORS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public opinion in London is broadly favourable towards efforts to address intolerance, hate and extremism. • Required project partners in local authorities and schools are receptive to the needs of the Shared Endeavour Fund and the organisations it supports.
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4. THEORY OF CHANGE

The Shared Endeavour Fund is based on the overarching theory that to effectively address intolerance, hate and extremism in London, a whole-of-society approach is required, one that leverages the unique capabilities of local communities and civil society.²⁹ To ensure that these groups can deliver community-based prevention initiatives, they need funding and support, something which has historically been difficult for smaller organisations delivering hyper-local activities to access.³⁰ Establishing a small grants programme (i.e. the Shared Endeavour Fund) will empower these organisations to undertake prevention activities in local schools and communities and thus support the Mayor to address intolerance, hate and extremism in London.

4.1 Inputs

Inputs are the financial, human, material and information resources used by a project or programme to deliver its activities and produce outputs. There are two core inputs to the Shared Endeavour Fund: capable grantees and appropriate beneficiaries.

Capable Grantees

Attracting capable grantees that operate in good faith to contribute to the priority themes of the Shared Endeavour Fund is the first input in the Theory of Change. To be eligible for the Fund, applicants must represent a legally constituted organisation with governance procedures that are outlined in a formal constitution. Applicants must also provide their organisation details, safeguarding policy and possess a bank account with at least two signatories.

Beyond these basic eligibility requirements, applying organisations must also demonstrate that they possess sufficient human, financial and material resources to implement the activities outlined in their proposals. This includes dedicated staff time for the projects and operational capacity to manage the planning, delivery and expenditures associated with them. In addition, applicants must possess clear expertise in the subject matter they address and the delivery models they plan to employ (e.g. knowledge of radicalisation pathways and evidence-based counselling approaches for a mentoring project). Finally, prospective grantees must show an ability to reach and liaise with people outside of their organisations. This includes a demonstrated capacity to recruit required beneficiaries but may also encompass existing relationships with project partners in schools and local authorities.

Appropriate Beneficiaries

Grantees are expected to select beneficiaries that are relevant and appropriate for their projects and salient to the aims of the Shared Endeavour Fund. To be successful, applying organisations must articulate which beneficiaries their project will serve, why those groups are especially in need of the programming they offer and how they will incentivise those beneficiaries' participation throughout the performance period.

In general, the Shared Endeavour Fund is expected to service three overlapping beneficiary populations:

- **The public, especially young people**

This population is very broad and includes any and all local communities in London, particularly children and young people. While this population allows grantees wide scope in beneficiary targeting, consideration must still be given to ensuring that those selected are appropriate for project activities and relevant to the aims of the Fund. The Shared Endeavour Fund expects that many (though not necessarily all) projects working with this population will be focused on awareness-raising and promoting positive actions, for example, by exposing students to counter-narratives or empowering them to conduct bystander interventions.

- **Vulnerable individuals and groups**

This population represents those who have demonstrated vulnerability to or are otherwise plausibly at elevated risk of being radicalised into supporting hateful or extremist ideologies or being recruited into extremist groups. Prior research in the field has shown that radicalisation is a complex causal process in which a myriad of psychological, social and material factors intersect to push and pull individuals towards extremism.³¹ This multiplicity of radicalisation pathways also means that individuals may be vulnerable to radicalisation, regardless of age, gender, ethnicity, religion, education or background.³² Prospective grantees working with this population will therefore need to demonstrate why they believe their beneficiaries are especially vulnerable to radicalisation and provide an evidence-based set of criteria for how they have identified and engaged these individuals. The Shared Endeavour Fund anticipates that many (though not necessarily all) projects working with this population will be focused on psychosocial resilience-building, for example, through one-to-one or group mentoring and counselling projects.

- **Frontline practitioners in education, social services, civil society and communities**

This population represents established community actors and other stakeholders who receive specialised training, such as teachers, social workers, faith leaders and community organisers. Any training provided to frontline practitioners should empower them to independently advance the aims of the Shared Endeavour Fund with other beneficiary groups during the project term and beyond. For example, projects working with this beneficiary population might train teachers to deliver media and digital literacy classes in schools to support students in recognising and managing the risks they encounter online.

4.2 Outputs

Outputs are the direct products or services delivered by a project or programme through its actions and activities. For this Theory of Change, outputs do not include any effects resulting from those products or services.

Projects Implemented

In the case of the Shared Endeavour Fund, the sole output of the programme is that supported organisations successfully deliver their projects as planned to the beneficiaries listed in their applications. Fund managers do not stipulate the specific form that grantees activities and outputs should take, only that they could reasonably be expected to contribute to their

project objectives and are appropriate for the priorities of the Fund. As part of the application process, applying organisations are required to provide a detailed description of their project, including a list of objectives, scope of work and a plan for beneficiary targeting and selection.

Project outputs may include (but are not limited to) the delivery of:

- Training programmes, workshops, conferences and other events.
- One-to-one or group mentoring, counselling and personal development sessions.
- Tools, guides, lesson plans and other resources.
- Sports, creative arts or field trip activities.
- Media, communication and counter-narrative campaigns.
- Technical assistance and support for beneficiary-led prevention activities, campaigns and teaching curricula.

4.3 Outcomes

Outcomes are the short- and medium- term effects that a project or programme is expected to produce through the successful delivery of its outputs. They may include changes in knowledge, awareness, skills, access, behaviour or practice, among others. For the Shared Endeavour Fund, projects are anticipated to contribute towards a range of outcomes that have been empirically shown to promote resilience to radicalisation and to prevent intolerance, hate, extremism and terrorism in local communities. These outcomes have been separated into four categories directly related to the priority themes of the Fund. The list of evidence-based outcomes associated with each theme is non-exhaustive, and applicants may pursue additional outcomes not included in this document.

Priority Theme One: Raise Awareness

Anticipated outcomes under this theme consist of helping Londoners to recognise and critically engage with intolerance, hate, extremism and terrorism. These outcomes are relevant to a wide range of Londoners, particularly young people; nevertheless, prospective grantees must still demonstrate why selected beneficiaries and boroughs are in greater need of support. Projects focused on awareness-raising are anticipated to reach a significant number of beneficiaries with a relatively low volume of contact hours per individual.

Possible outcomes may include (but are not limited to) improving beneficiaries’:

- Understanding of intolerance, hate, extremism and terrorism and the impacts of these on individuals and communities.³³
- Knowledge of extremist ideologies, radicalisation pathways and recognition of warning signs.³⁴
- Resistance to extremist narratives and support for counter and alternative narratives (i.e. message inoculation).³⁵
- Ability to recognise and manage risks online, including mis/disinformation, conspiracy theories and other harmful content (i.e. digital literacy).³⁶
- Access to on- and offline support, resources and services related to intolerance, hate, extremism and radicalisation.³⁷

Priority Theme Two: Build Resilience

The outcomes advanced under Priority Theme Two concern the promotion of protective factors associated with resilience to radicalisation and extremist recruitment. Prospective projects may target a wide range of psychosocial factors that have been empirically linked with resilience.³⁸ However, they must still demonstrate why selected beneficiaries are plausibly at elevated risk of radicalisation, which risk factors they possess and how project activities will serve to mitigate these risks. Due to the relative difficulty of positively affecting personality traits and associated attitudes, projects focused on building psychosocial resilience are expected to reach a low-to-medium number of beneficiaries, with a relatively high number of contact hours per individual.

Possible outcomes may include (but are not limited to) improving beneficiaries’:

- **Emotional resilience:** Improve beneficiaries’ capacity to cope with stressful situations as a protective factor against frustration, particularly where this frustration may lead to aggressive behaviour directed at out-groups.³⁹
- **Self-esteem:** Support beneficiaries to develop greater feelings of self-worth in order to strengthen their self-control and prevent them from adopting negative coping strategies such as scapegoating and aggression against out-groups.⁴⁰
- **Sense of non-violent purpose and opportunity:** Help beneficiaries to find a tolerant, non-violent sense of meaning and purpose and thereby reduce their likelihood of finding meaning through identification with hateful or extremist viewpoints.⁴¹
- **Sense of belonging:** Reduce beneficiaries’ sense of exclusion and ostracism from mainstream society in order to diminish the attractiveness of involvement in extremist communities and organisations, and to reduce their likelihood of engaging in violent or illegal behaviours.⁴²
- **Empathy and perspective-taking:** Increase beneficiaries’ propensity for considering the perspectives and viewpoints of others in order to reduce their likelihood of out-group stereotyping and thus their potential for supporting ideologically-driven discrimination and violence.⁴³
- **Tolerance of difference:** Increase beneficiaries’ acceptance, respect and appreciation for difference and diversity as a protective factor against embracing prejudiced or hateful attitudes and viewpoints.⁴⁴

Priority Theme Three: Promote Positive Action

Anticipated outcomes under this theme centre on equipping and motivating beneficiaries to engage in positive actions that challenge intolerant, hateful and extremist attitudes and behaviours on- and offline. These actions may include a wide range of prosocial behaviours like helping, sharing, comforting and cooperating. Like awareness-raising, the outcomes associated with this priority theme are relevant to a wide range of Londoners; however, applicants must still demonstrate why targeted beneficiaries are both in need of (and amenable to) engaging in the positive actions proposed. Depending on the actions and behaviours selected, projects may work at a variety of reach and intensity levels. For example, a project promoting hate crime reporting processes will likely have high reach and require a low number of contact hours, while one training youth activists would require significantly more time and would thus have much lower reach.

Possible outcomes may include (but are not limited to) improving beneficiaries’:

- Awareness of and intention to use reporting processes, including for hate incidents and crimes, extremist materials and radicalisation concerns.⁴⁵
- Ability and intention to conduct bystander interventions and call out/in intolerant and hateful attitudes and behaviours.⁴⁶
- Sense of self-efficacy, responsibility and intention to engage in prosocial behaviours.⁴⁷
- Support for and participation in relevant social and community causes that challenge intolerance, hate and extremism.⁴⁸

Priority Theme Four: Enhance Prevention Efforts

The outcomes advanced under this theme focus on training, equipping and motivating frontline practitioners to carry out activities in their local schools and communities that challenge, pushback or pre-empt intolerance, hate, extremism and radicalisation. Frontline practitioners may include actors in education, social services, civil society and communities that are relevant for achieving the aims of the Shared Endeavour Fund. Applications addressing this priority theme are expected to include processes for monitoring any activities delivered by frontline practitioners during the funding term and assessing the resultant outcomes at both the practitioner and ultimate beneficiary level. These projects are anticipated to reach a low number of direct beneficiaries relative to the other population groups supported by the Fund, with a medium-to-high volume of contact hours per individual.

Possible outcomes may include (but are not limited to) improving beneficiaries’:

- Capacity to design, implement and/or monitor activities addressing intolerance, hate and extremism.⁴⁹
- Ability and intention to have difficult conversations about intolerance, hate, extremism and terrorism with young, marginalised or otherwise vulnerable individuals and groups.⁵⁰
- Ability to recognise warning signs and safeguard young and vulnerable individuals.⁵¹
- Access to research, tools, guides, lesson plans and other resources for prevention.

4.4 Goal

The goal level of a Theory of Change represents the primary purpose of a project or programme and is the highest-order objective to which an intervention is intended to contribute. Programmatic goals typically reflect a sustained change in the state or condition of beneficiaries and/or society.

Community Prevention

The goal of the Shared Endeavour Fund is to empower London’s civil society to challenge intolerance, hate and extremism and to foster local communities that are more resilient to radicalisation and extremist recruitment. This goal is expected to occur in the long-term over the course of repeated rounds of funding and be achieved through the cumulative effects of Shared Endeavour Fund projects and the sustained support to civil society provided by the funding scheme.

5. ASSUMPTIONS

There are several key assumptions underpinning the Theory of Change for the Shared Endeavour Fund. Assumptions are hypotheses about conditions, factors or risks which could affect the progress or success of the Fund and the projects it supports. The assumptions listed in this document fall into two categories: causal assumptions and external factors.

5.1 Causal Assumptions

These are assumptions about how and why change is expected to occur, and they describe factors that may impact the connections between components in the Theory of Change. The key causal assumptions for the Shared Endeavour Fund are:

- **Capable grantees apply for and are awarded Shared Endeavour Fund grants.**

There are a variety of organisations delivering programming in London on topics relevant to the priorities of the Fund that are actively looking to secure grants for their activities. Based on the previous rounds of the Shared Endeavour Fund, it is likely that 50—100 eligible organisations will apply for each funding call. A rigorous, multi-stage review process is in place to ensure that coherent applications, well-aligned with the priorities of the Fund and representative of London’s diverse communities, are recognised and awarded grants.
- **Targeted beneficiaries are relevant to the aims of the Shared Endeavour Fund and sufficiently incentivised and able to participate in project activities.**

Part of the application review process includes assessing the extent to which proposed projects have sufficiently considered how to target and engage intended beneficiaries. The strongest applications will be those in which selected beneficiaries are specified, their needs and vulnerabilities are clearly demonstrated and the means to attract those beneficiaries to participate are appropriately compelling.
- **The scale and duration of supported projects is sufficient for them to achieve a measurable contribution to the priority themes of the Shared Endeavour Fund.**

The amount of funding offered by the Shared Endeavour Fund is not unlimited, nor is the delivery period afforded to supported projects. However, the previous Shared Endeavour Fund evaluations have demonstrated that an operating budget of £20,000 to £50,000 for projects delivered over seven months is sufficient to attract grantees capable of producing short-to-medium-term outcomes among their beneficiaries.⁵²
- **CSOs have unique access to, knowledge of and credibility among local communities, making them effective prevention partners for government.**

The Shared Endeavour Fund is based on the overarching theory that a whole-of-society approach, leveraging the capabilities of civil society, is more effective at addressing intolerance, hate and extremism than solely government-led models. This assessment is supported by many actors in the field that have increasingly called for greater CSO inclusion in national prevention frameworks, such as the UK Intelligence

and Security Committee, Global Counterterrorism Forum, UN Office of Counter Terrorism and Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE), EU Radicalisation Awareness Network, among others.⁵³

5.2 External Factors

These assumptions consist of environmental factors that have the potential to affect the results of the Shared Endeavour Fund but are external to it and thus outside of its control. The primary external factors that may impact the Fund and supported projects are:

- **Public opinion in London is broadly favourable towards efforts to address intolerance, hate and extremism.**

Public opinion, either positive or negative, could impact the delivery of Shared Endeavour Fund projects. For example, despite producing positive outcomes for beneficiaries, a given project could be publicly criticised if it is perceived (rightly or wrongly) as working at odds either with another community group or with public sentiment. To mitigate the risk of adverse public opinion, successful applicants will be encouraged to carefully consider their project's public image and communications.

- **Required project partners in local authorities and schools are receptive to the needs of the Shared Endeavour Fund and the organisations it supports.**

To effectively deliver their activities, funded organisations will require the input and support of local authorities and schools. These actors are essential both for targeting project activities and accessing beneficiaries. Accordingly, applying organisations are selected in large part because of their track record of securing cooperation with required project partners. In some instances, MOPAC may also liaise with local authorities on behalf of grantees to facilitate connections between these parties.

ENDNOTES

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- ⁹ Comerford, M. and Havlicek, S. (2021). *Op. cit.*; Comerford, M. (2023). *Op. cit.*
- ¹⁰ Home Office (2023b). *Op. cit.*; Home Office (2024a). *Op. cit.*
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